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SENTENCING OF YOUTHFUL MISDEMEANANTS UNDER
THE YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT: ELIMINATING
DISPARITIES CREATED BY THE FEDERAL
MAGISTRATE ACT OF 1979
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Youth Corrections Act (YCA)' was enacted in 1950 in
response to increasing concern over the disproportionate amount of
crime attributable to youths2 and the apparent failure of the modern
penitentiary system to rehabilitate committed youth offenders. 3 The
YCA expanded the range of sentencing options for youthful offenders4
and requires rehabilitative treatment 5 in special facilities6 removed
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976).
2. H.R. Rep. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 [hereinafter cited as 1950 House
Report], reprinted in 1950 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 3983, 3984: S. Rep. No. 1180, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949) (statement of Harrison Tweed, President, American Law
Institute) [hereinafter cited as 1949 Senate Report], see Dorszynski v. United States,
418 U.S. 424, 432-33 (1974).
3. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433 (1974): Watts v. Hadden, 651
F.2d 1354, 1356 (10th Cir. 1981): 1950 House Report, supra note 2, at 2, reprinted in
1950 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. at 3985: Comment, The Federal Government's Role In
The Treatment of Youth Offenders: Two Approaches, 16 St. Louis U.L.J. 459, 463-
64 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Government's Role]; Note, Tie Federal Youth Correc-
tions Act: Past Concern in Need of Legislative Reappraisal, 11 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
229, 229-30 & nn. 5-6 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Legislative Reappraisal].
4. Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1356 (10th Cir. 1981): United States ex rel.
Dane), v. Arnold, 572 F.2d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 1978); 1950 House Report, supra note 2.
at 1, reprinted in 1950 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. at 3983: 1949 Senate Report, supra
note 2, at 1. "Youth offender" is defined as one who is under 22 years of age at the
time of conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 5006(d) (1976). Youths under 18 years of age will
generally not be sentenced under the YCA, but rather under the Juvenile Delin-
quency Act. Id. §§ 5031-5042 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), see Dorszynski v. United
States, 418 U.S. 424, 433 n.9 (1974). Offenders who are over 22 but not vet 26 may
be sentenced under the YCA if the court finds that it is reasonable to believe the
defendant will benefit from YCA treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 4216 (1976): see S. Rep. No.
2013, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3891,
3892.
The sentencing options provided by the YCA are: placement of the youth on
probation if the court finds he does not need commitment, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a)
(1976); a six-year indeterminate rehabilitative sentence unless the court finds that the
offender will not benefit from rehabilitation, id. § 5010(b), see infra note 8: a
rehabilitative sentence in excess of the six-year limit of § 5010(b), but not exceeding
the statutory penalty for the offense, if the court finds that the offender may not
derive sufficient benefit from the six-year sentence, id. § 5010(c); and an adult
sentence, if the court finds that the rehabilitative sentence will not benefit the 'outh
offender, id. § 5010(d). The Supreme Court has stated that under the last option, an
explicit finding must be made that the youth will not benefit from YCA sentencing.
Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443-44 (1974). However, specific reasons
for the finding are not requireo. Id. at 441.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976). "Treatment'* is defined as '"corrective and preven-
tive guidance and training designed to protect the public by correcting the antisocial
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from the destructive atmosphere of adult institutions.7 The most con-
troversial provision of the YCA calls for an indeterminate sentence,
which may not exceed six years, when a judge decides that confine-
ment is appropriate,8 regardless of the maximum term an adult could
serve for the same offense. 9 While under certain circumstances a judge
may impose a longer sentence under the YCA,10 he is not given
tendencies of youth offenders." Id. § 5006(f). The YCA treatment program was
modeled on the British Borstal system, which combines a high degree of flexibility
and individuality with an arduous work and recreation program in the treatment of
youth offenders. "[The Borstal system] is predicated on the concept that criminal
youth require special treatment because of the number and kind of offenses they
commit, the causation factors underlying their conduct, and the prospect they hold
out for success through correctional treatment." 1950 House Report, supra note 2, at
5, reprinted in 1950 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. at 3987.
6. The YCA requires that institutions be designed or adapted for YCA treat-
ment; that insofar as practical these institutions be used solely for the treatment of
youth offenders; and that youth offenders be segregated from other offenders and
from each other according to their needs. 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976). Interpretation of
this provision has varied among the circuits. One view is that impracticality may
excuse a failure to provide separate facilities but will not justify a failure to segregate
youth offenders from other offenders within an institution. United States ex rel.
Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d 107, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1978); see United States v. Smith,
683 F.2d 1236, 1242 & n.19 (9th Cir. 1982). Other courts have held that "insofar as
practical" refers to both the requirement of separate facilities and the requirement of
segregation within a common facility. In limited circumstances, therefore, impracti-
cality may justify integration of YCA and non-YCA offenders. See Watts v. Hadden,
651 F.2d 1354, 1366 (10th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Bell, 487 F. Supp. 977, 983-85
(E.D. Mich. 1980); Brown v. Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755, 772-73 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
One court has held not only that YCA prisoners may be integrated on the grounds of
impracticality, but also that the burden of proving the practicality of segregation or
separate facilities is on the prisoner. Outing v. Bell, 632 F.2d 1144, 1145-46 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
7. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 207-08 (1981); United States v. Smith,
683 F.2d 1236, 1241 (9th Cir. 1982); Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1357, 1365
(10th Cir. 1981); see Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542, 545-46 (1978).
8. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010(b), 5017(c) (1976). A youth sentenced under this provision
may be conditionally released under supervision any time during his commitment.
Id. §§ 5017(a), (c), 5019. He may be unconditionally released after one year of
conditional release. Id. § 5017(b). The maximum period of commitment is four
years. Id. § 5017(c). The period of commitment and supervision may not exceed six
years. See id. If a youthful offender is unconditionally released prior to six years, his
conviction must be set aside. Id. § 5021(a). See infra note 13. For the purposes of this
Note, the indeterminate sentence is referred to in terms of its maximum duration.
9. Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1357 -(10th Cir. 1981); United States ex rel.
Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d 107, 110-11 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Torun, 537
F.2d 661, 663 (2d Cir. 1976); Brown v. Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755, 766 (W.D. Wis.
1977).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1976). A sentence in excess of six years may be imposed
only if the maximum adult sentence exceeds six years and the judge makes a specific
finding that the youth may not derive maximum benefit from the six-year period. Id.
The sentence may not exceed the maximum adult penalty prescribed for the offense.
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discretion to prescribe confinement for a shorter period." YCA sen-
tences that exceed the maximum an adult could receive for the same
offense have withstood equal protection challenges 2 on the basis of
the rehabilitative nature of YCA commitment.'
3
11. Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1372 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Jackson, 550 F.2d 830, 831-32 (2d Cir. 1977): United States v. Cruz, 544 F.2d 1162,
1164 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Waters, 437 F.2d 722, 726 n.16 (D.C. Cir.
1970); United States v. Murphy, 532 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (D. Nev. 1982). The Ninth
Circuit has held that a judge may impose a "split sentence" whereby a youth is placed
on probation under 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), but is committed for a
period not to exceed six months as a condition of probation, United States v. Smith,
683 F.2d 1236, 1238-40 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. McDonald, 611 F.2d 1291,
1294 (9th Cir. 1980). In United States v. Murphy, 532 F. Supp. 999 (D. Nev. 1982),
however, the court stated that the issue of the discretion of the court to impose
shorter sentences was not specifically addressed by the Ninth Circuit: "It is the view
of this Court that when faced with the issue, the Ninth Circuit will follow the
authority which does not permit the limitation [of sentence length]." Id. at 1002.
12. E.g., United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Guidry
v. United States, 433 F.2d 968, 969 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); United States v.
Vaught, 355 F. Supp. 1348, 1349-50 (W.D. Mo. 1972); see Carter v. United States,
306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467,
473 (5th Cir. 1958). Although the fifth amendment, unlike the fourteenth amend-
ment, does not contain an equal protection clause, it has been held that equal
protection guarantees are also contained in the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). The fourteenth and fifth amendment protections
are generally identical. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (per curiam); L.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-I, at 992 (1978); Karst, The Fifth Amend-
ment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. Rev. 541, 552-58 (1977). However,
there may be cases in which "overriding national interests" justify federal legislation
under the fifth amendment even though the same legislation, if passed by a state,
would violate the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 558-62. YCA sentences have also
withstood claims of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amend-
ment. E.g., United States v. Rehfield, 416 F.2d 273, 275 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 996 (1970); United States v. Dancis, 406 F.2d 729, 730 (2d Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1019 (1969).
13. Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("Actual con-
finement under the [YCA] may be greater or may be less depending on many factors
we cannot know or anticipate. But the basic theory of that Act is rehabilitative and in
a sense this rehabilitation may be regarded as comprising the quid pro quo for a
longer confinement .... ); Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467, 472 (5th
Cir. 1958) (YCA "provides ... not heavier penalties ... but the opportunity to
escape from the physical and psychological shocks and traumas attendant upon
serving an ordinary penal sentence while obtaining the benefits of corrective treat-
ment, looking to rehabilitation and social redemption and restoration."). YCA sen-
tences have also been distinguished from adult penalties because under 18 U.S.C. §
5021(a) (1976), the conviction must be set aside if the youth is released prior to the
expiration of his maximum sentence. Id.; see Tuten v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1412,
1417 (1983); United States v. Hunt, 661 F.2d 72, 75 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Arrington, 618 F.2d 1119, 1124 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1086 (1981);
Tatum v. United States, 310 F.2d 854, 855-56 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (per curiam).
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Additional disparities in the sentencing of youthful offenders were
created by several provisions of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979
(FMA) ,14 which grants magistrates the authority to try and sentence
misdemeanor offenders' 5 and clarifies the role of the magistrate in
YCA cases.' The FMA authorizes magistrates to use YCA sentencing
options in the same manner as district court judges, except that magis-
trates may not impose YCA sentences exceeding one year of confine-
ment or probation.' 7 As a result, while youths sentenced by a judge
are subject to the six-year indeterminate sentence, youths sentenced by
a magistrate may receive an indeterminate sentence of only one
year. IS
In United States v. Amidon, 19 the Ninth Circuit interpreted the
FMA's sentencing limitations on magistrates as implicitly limiting the
sentencing authority of judges, and thus as eliminating sentencing
disparities between youthful and adult misdemeanants. 20 The court
held that neither judges nor magistrates may impose YCA sentences on
misdemeanants longer than the adult penalty prescribed for the of-
fense. 2 1 Other courts, however, have concluded that the FMA applies
exclusively to magistrates, 22 thus leaving the six-year sentence option
intact for judges. Under this view, however, the defendant's right to
equal protection may be violated because the maximum length of his
sentence depends solely on whether the sentencing official is a judge or
a magistrate.
23
Part I of this Note analyzes the FMA's sentencing limitations and
concludes that they do not extend to district court judges. In Part II,
14. Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 7(a), 93 Stat. 643, 645 (1979) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3401 (Supp. V 1981)).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a) (Supp. V 1981); see Tolson v. United States, 448 A.2d
248, 251 (D.C. 1982). The FMA expanded the criminal jurisdiction of magistrates,
which had previously been limited to minor offenses for which the maximum penalty
was imprisonment for one year or a fine of $1000, or both. H.R. Rep. No. 287, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 House Report]; S. Rep. No. 74,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 [hereinafter cited as 1979 Senate Report], reprinted in 1979
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1469, 1474.
16. 1979 House Report, supra note 15, at 18-19; 1979 Senate Report, supra note
15, at 7, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1475-76; see 18 U.S.C. §
3401(g) (Supp. V 1981).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g) (Supp. V 1981). Petty offense sentences are limited to a
maximum of six months. Id. For the purposes of this Note, the magistrate's limit is
referred to as "one year."
18. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 588-89 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
19. 627 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1980).
20. Id. at 1027. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
21. 627 F.2d at 1027; accord United States v. Hunt, 661 F.2d 72, 75 (6th Cir.
1981). See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
22. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 587-88 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United
States v. Van Lufkins, 676 F.2d 1189, 1194 (8th Cir. 1982); Tolson v. United States,
448 A.2d 248, 252 (D.C. 1982).
23. See infra pt. II(A).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
this Note contends that the resulting disparities in YCA sentences
violate equal protection guarantees and frustrate the legislative goals
of the YCA. Part III examines various solutions and concludes that
these sentencing inequities can best be removed by amending the
FMA to authorize magistrates to sentence youthful offenders under
the YCA in the same manner as district court judges.
I. THE LIMITED REACH OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES ACT
The magistrate system was created in 196824 to alleviate the increas-
ing burdens on the district court25 by authorizing magistrates to per-
form a variety of adjudicative and administrative functions.2 6 The
criminal jurisdiction of magistrates was expanded by the Federal
Magistrate Act of 197927 from "minor offenses ' 28 to "misdemean-
24. Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
25. 1979 Senate Report, supra note 15, at 2, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 1470; H.R. Rep. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 [hereinafter cited
as 1968 House Report], reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4252, 4254-
55; S. Rep. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 26 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967
Senate Report]; Spaniol, The Federal Magistrates Act: History and Development,
1974 Ariz. St. L.J. 565, 565; Note, The Validity of United States Magistrates'
Criminal Jurisdiction, 60 Va. L. Rev. 697, 698 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Magis-
trates' Criminal Jurisdiction].
26. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see 1968 House Report, supra note
25, at 11-12, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4253-55; McCabe,
The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 Harv. J. on Legis. 343, 349-50 (1979);
Spaniol, supra note 25, at 569-70; Magistrates' Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 25,
at 697. The FMA's extension of criminal jurisdiction to magistrates has been ques-
tioned as an impermissible extension of Article III judicial power to non-Article III
judicial officers. 1968 House Report, supra note 25, at 21, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 4264; see McCabe, supra, at 366. The constitutionality of
this delegation has generally been defended on the grounds that: 1) the exercise of
magistrate jurisdiction is entirely consensual; 2) the magistrate remains an adjunct of
the district court; and 3) decisions of the magistrate may be appealed to the district
court. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform: Hearings on H.R.
1046 and H.R. 2202 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
99-109 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Hearings]; H.R. Rep. No. 1364, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 11 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 House Report]; 1967 Senate Report,
supra note 25, at 31; 125 Cong. Rec. 26,819 (statement of Rep. Rodino); Clark,
Parajudges and the Administration of Justice, 24 Vand. L. Rev. 1167, 1177 (1971);
McCabe, supra, at 366.
27. Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 7, 93 Stat. 643, 645-46 (1979) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3401 (Supp. V 1981)).
28. Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 302(a), 82 Stat. 1107, 1115-
16 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a) (1976)). "Minor offense" is
defined in the original act as a misdemeanor "the penalty for which does not exceed
imprisonment for a period of one year, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both."
18 U.S.C. § 3401(f) (1976), repealed by Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-82, § 7(f), 93 Stat. 643, 646 (1979).
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ors," 21 thereby giving magistrates the authority to try any case involv-
ing an offense carrying a maximum penalty of one year imprison-
ment.30 The FMA also authorizes magistrates to impose YCA
sentences, but limits this power to one year for misdemeanors and six
months for petty offenses. 31
In United States v. Amidon, 32 the Ninth Circuit interpreted the
FMA as limiting not only the sentencing authority of magistrates, but
also the authority of the district court. 33 In its analysis, the court first
determined that longer sentences for youths were no longer justified
by their rehabilitative nature34 and that therefore, when it passed the
FMA, "Congress acted to eliminate the inequities between youth and
adult sentencing. " 35 The court then reasoned that Congress could not
have intended to eliminate sentencing inequities in cases tried before
magistrates but not in those tried before judges, 36 and concluded that
"it [is] implicit in the [FMA] that Congress intended that neither a
district court judge nor a magistrate may sentence a youth under the
[YCA] to a term of confinement longer than it could impose on an
adult." 37 Although Amidon's broad reading of the FMA serves to
eliminate disparities between the sentencing powers of judges and
magistrates, as well as between sentences imposed on adult and youth
offenders, it raises questions of statutory construction.
A. Statutory Construction of the FMA
1. Express Language
Anidon's conclusion that the FMA limits all YCA misdemeanor
sentences to their maximum adult length finds no support in the
statute's express language. 38 To the contrary, the language indicates
29. 18 U.S.C § 3401(a) (Supp. V 1981). The FMA removed the $1000 fine
limitation of the original Magistrates Act. See supra note 28.
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). As in the original Magistrates Act, however, this
jurisdiction may be exercised only after the defendant is advised of his right to trial
before a district court judge and consents in writing to be tried by a magistrate. Id. §
3401(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Under the FMA, a defendant may also demand a
jury trial before the magistrate. Id. § 3401(b) (Supp. V 1981). This right did not exist
under the original Act. See 1979 Senate Report, supra note 15, at 17, reprinted in
1979 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1485.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g)(1) (Supp. V 1981). The FMA also limits the maximum
length of probation to one year for misdemeanors and six months for petty offenses.
Id. § 3401(g)(3).
32. 627 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1980).
33. Id. at 1026-27.
34. Id. at 1026; accord United States v. Hunt, 661 F.2d 72, 75 & n.7 (6th Cir.
1981). See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
35. 627 F.2d at 1026.
36. Id. at 1027.
37. Id.
38. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1982). It is a well-
accepted principle that the interpretation of a statutory provision must begin with
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that Congress did not intend the FMA to have any effect on the
sentencing authority of district court judges: 39 "The magistrate may
* . . impose sentence and exercise the other powers granted to the
district court ... except that . . . [he] may not sentence the
youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General
• . . for a period in excess of 1 year .... .,40 By phrasing the sentenc-
ing authority of the magistrate under the YCA more narrowly than
the authority of the district court, Congress must have intended to
leave the judge's broader power intact. 41 An interpretation equating
the sentencing authority of the two would thus contradict the express
intent of Congress to provide a more circumscribed role for magis-
trates.
42
Moreover, Amidon's initial determination that Congress acted to
eliminate sentencing disparities between youthful and adult offenders
is also inconsistent with the express provisions of the FMA. 43 Although
the FMA limits YCA sentences imposed by magistrates to one year for
misdemeanors and six months for petty offenses, 44 some offenses carry
maximum adult penalties that are shorter than the one-year and six-
month limits. 45 For example, a youthful offender convicted by a
the language of the statute itself. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568
(1979); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell,
J., concurring); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction
§ 45.01 (4th ed. 1973); see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689
(1979). Although this Note contends that the language of the FMA is unambiguous,
see infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text, it employs principles of statutory
construction because cases have reached conflicting results as to its meaning. See
generally 2A C. Sands, supra, § 45.02 (4th ed. 1973 & Supp. 1982) (unambiguous
statutes should not be "'interpreted"; however, words do not have intrinsic meaning,
and a statute may become ambiguous due to its relation to other statutes).
39. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Tolson v.
United States, 448 A.2d 248, 252 (D.C. 1982).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
41. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1982): Tolson v.
United States, 448 A.2d 248, 252 (D.C. 1982); see United States v. Van Lufkins, 676
F.2d 1189, 1194 (8th Cir. 1982); 2A C. Sands, supra note 38, § 47.11. See generally
E. Crawford, The Construction of Statutes § 299, at 611-12 (1940) ("*[A]n exception
in a statute makes the legislative intent plain that the statute should apply in all cases
not excepted.").
42. See United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 586 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(Such interpretation would not be justified because it makes "legislative history
correct at the expense of making the plain language of the law itself inaccurate.").
See generally E. Crawford, supra note 41, § 164 (legislative intent must be ascer-
tained primarily from the statutory language); 2A C. Sands, supra note 38, § 46.03
(the best evidence of legislative intent is what the legislature said in the statute itself).
43. See United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g)(1) (Supp. V 1981). These sentencing limitations also
apply to sentences of probation. Id. § 3401(g)(3).
45. See United States v. Hunt, 661 F.2d 72, 73 & n.2 (6th Cir. 1981) (youth
convicted of simple assault under 18 U.S.C. § 113(e) (1976) (carrying a maximum
adult penalty of three months imprisonment or $300, or both).
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magistrate of a petty offense carrying a maximum adult penalty of
three months is still subject to the YCA six-month sentence-clearly in
excess of the adult limit.46 In such cases, the wording of the FMA
envisions youth sentences in excess of adult penalties. 47 In contrast, the
FMA's limitation on the length of probation 4 subjects a youthful
offender to a much shorter maximum period of supervision than that
permitted for an adult. While the maximum probation period for an
adult is five years, 49 a magistrate, when placing a youthful offender on
probation, is limited to imposing a one-year period. 50 Thus, the lan-
guage of the FMA clearly does not, as Amidon determined, require
sentences of identical length for youths sentenced under the YCA and
adults.
2. Legislative History
The conflicting interpretations of the one-year sentence limitation
center on the following statement in the Conference Report discussing
the FMA:
To avoid the possibility of a youth offender being punished for up
to six years for violation of a petty offense or misdemeanor, the
conferees resolved that no youth offender could serve a longer
sentence under the YCA than he could have served as an adult.
This mandate-no more than one year for conviction of a misde-
meanor or six months for conviction of a petty offense-explicitly is
set forth in the conference substitute.5'
Certain courts have interpreted this language as a congressional man-
date to eliminate the sentencing disparities between youthful and
adult misdemeanants. 52 These courts further conclude that because
the inequities of disparate sentencing exist whether a defendant is
sentenced by a judge or a magistrate, Congress must have intended
the FMA to limit the YCA sentencing authority of both. 53 A full
46. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 586-87 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1982). But
see United States v. Hunt, 661 F.2d 72, 75-76 (6th Cir. 1981) (as a result of the FMA,
YCA sentences of youthful misdemeanants may not exceed adult sentences).
47. 695 F.2d at 586.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
49. Id. § 3651 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Magistrates are authorized to impose the
five-year probation period on adult offenders. See Judicial Conference of the United
States, The Federal Magistrates System 53-54- (1981) [hereinafter cited as Judicial
Conference].
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g)(3) (Supp. V 1981).
51. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 444. 96th Cong., ist Sess. 9-10 [hereinafter cited as
1979 Conference Report], reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1487,
1490.
52. United States v. Hunt, 661 F.2d 72, 75 (6th Cir. 1981). United States v.
Amidon, 627 F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 1980).
53. United States v. Amidon, 627 F.2d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir. 1980) ("We see no
reason why a defendant . . .sentenced by a district court judge instead of by a
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reading of the legislative history, however, reveals that the FMA was
designed neither to eliminate sentence disparities nor to affect the
sentencing authority of the district court in any way. 54 Rather, its
purpose was to increase the efficiency and flexibility of the district
court. 55 The legislative reports of the FMA repeatedly refer to the
desired expansion of the magistrate system56 and the expected econo-
mies resulting therefrom .57
In extending to magistrates the power to sentence youths under the
YCA, however, Congress imposed the one-year limit on magistrates to
maintain their powers within traditional boundaries. 58 The Senate
version of the FMA explicitly limited youth sentences imposed by
magistrate should be subject to the potential inequity of indeterminate YCA sentenc-
ing nor why Congress would have intended such a result."): accord United States v.
Hunt, 661 F.2d 72, 75 & n.8 (6th Cir. 1981).
54. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1982): Tolson v.
United States, 448 A.2d 248, 252 (D.C. 1982).
55. 1977 Hearings, supra note 26, at 188-89 (testimony of Daniel Meador, Assist-
ant Attorney General); 1979 House Report, supra note 15, at 2, 20: 125 Cong. Rec.
16,447 (1979) (statements of Reps. McClory and Gudger): id. at 16,448 (statement of
Rep. Moorhead); Judicial Conference, supra note 49, at 7; McCabe, supra note 26,
at 380. The immediate alleviation of caseloads, while not the principal reason for the
FMA, id., was recognized as an important resulting benefit. Id.; see 1979 Senate
Report, supra note 15, at 2, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1470;
125 Cong. Rec. 16,449 (1979) (statement of Rep. Corrada); 123 Cong. Rec. 16,860
(1977) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
56. See 1979 House Report, supra note 15, at 5: 1979 Senate Report, supra note
15, at 6, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1474; 125 Cong. Rec.
26,820 (1979) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier); id. at 9,469 (statement of Sen.
DeConcini); cf. S. Rep. No. 625, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1976).
57. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/Magistrates Reform-1979: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1979) ("U.S. Magis-
trates would be able to try thousands of additional misdemeanor cases permitting the
District Court Judges to turn their attention to more serious felony cases ....")
(statement of Lawrence Margolis, Magistrate) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Hearings]:
1979 Senate Report, supra note 15, at 6, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 1475 ("It is estimated that approximately 1,500 cases now prosecuted ... as
misdemeanors outside the jurisdiction of magistrates would be brought within the
scope of magistrates' jurisdiction ...."); 125 Cong. Rec. 26,822 (1979) ("The pri-
mary purpose of this legislation is to improve the quality of decisions and, at the same
time, provide flexibility and . . . quicker, less expensive and less formal access to
justice.") (statement of Rep. Railsback); see 123 Cong. Rec. 16,860 (1977) ("The
proposed expansions of the criminal jurisdiction of magistrates should have an appre-
ciable impact in reducing the criminal dockets of the district courts and, as a
consequence, in affording speedier and less costly justice to criminal defendants.")
(statement of Griffin Bell, Attorney General).
58. See United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Tolson v.
United States, 448 A.2d 248, 252 (D.C. 1982). See infra notes 68-75 and accompany-
ing text.
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magistrates to adult length.59 This provision was rejected in favor of
the present one-year limit,60 indicating that Congress did not intend to
restrict sentences imposed by either magistrates or judges to adult
length,," but rather intended simply to maintain the magistrate's
traditional one-year limitY2 Therefore, because neither the language
of the statute nor its legislative history indicates that Congress in-
tended to alter the sentencing authority of judges, the only remaining
basis for Amidon's conclusion is an interpretation that the FMA im-
plicitly repealed the YCA sentencing provisions.
3. Implicit Repeal of YCA Sentencing Provisions
The Amidon court stated that the FMA implicitly limits the sen-
tencing power of district court judges when imposing YCA sentences
on misdemeanants. 3 Repeal by implication, however, is proper only
in the most limited circumstances. 64 The reluctance to infer from one
act a congressional intention to amend or repeal another stems from
deference to Congress' authority over the lawmaking process. 65 The
assumption is that when Congress legislates, it does so with an eye
toward the entire body of existing law and that it will, when neces-
sary, alter or repeal those statutes that require change. 66 Therefore,
this legislative function will be left to judicial implication only when
statutes are irreconcilable.
67
59. S. 237, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(3), 125 Cong. Rec. 16,625 (1979).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g)(1), (3) (Supp. V 1981); see United States v. Donelson,
695 F.2d 583, 586 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
61. See 2A C. Sands, supra note 38, § 48.18, at 224 ("Adoption of an amendment
is evidence that the legislature intends to change the provisions of the original bill."
(footnote omitted)).
62. See United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
63. United States v. Amidon, 627 F.2d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir. 1980).
64. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); IA C. Sands, supra
note 38, § 23.10; see Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266-67 (1981); Watts v. Hadden,
651 F.2d 1354, 1381-82 (10th Cir. 1981). See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
65. See 1A C. Sands, supra note 38, § 23.10.
66. E. Crawford, supra note 41, § 310; IA C. Sands, supra note 38, § 23.10, at
231; 2A id. § 56.02, at 404. In Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354 (10th Cir. 1981), the
court refused to find an implied repeal of the YCA release requirements in the parole
guidelines authorized by the Parole Commission & Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. §
4206 (1976). 651 F.2d at 1382. The new guidelines provide objective factors to be
used in parole determinations, while the YCA bases its release decisions on the
institutional progress of the particular offender. See infra notes 92-97 and accompa-
nying text. The court held that the guidelines of § 4206 did not impliedly repeal the
YCA's rehabilitative considerations because Congress had before it the entire YCA
and did not specifically alter the release provisions, thus indicating an intention to
leave the provisions intact. 651 F.2d at 1382.
67. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 133-34 (1974); Mor-
ton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974); Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S.
497, 503 (1936); United States v. Van Lufkins, 676 F.2d 1189, 1194 (8th Cir. 1982);
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Analysis of the FMA and the YCA indicates that not only do the two
statutes not conflict with each other, 6 but that the FMA was designed
to reconcile the existing sentencing authority of judges under the YCA
with the limited jurisdiction of magistrates. 69 The YCA authorizes a
six-year indeterminate sentence for youth offenders-even when the
crime charged is a misdemeanor. 70 Prior to the FMA, it was unclear
whether this maximum six-year sentence removed YCA misdemeanor
cases from the magistrate's jurisdiction v.7  As misdemeanors, they
seemed to be within the authority of the magistrate; 72 yet because
they carried penalties in excess of the traditional one-year limit, they
appeared to be beyond the scope of the magistrate's jurisdiction. 73 To
reconcile the need to expand magistrate authority with the desire to
maintain the circumscribed boundaries of magistrate jurisdiction,
Congress granted YCA authority to magistrates but limited the sen-
tences imposed under that authority to the traditional limits.74 Limi-
tation of the magistrate's YCA sentencing power does not represent an
intention to change YCA provisions, but rather an attempt to accom-
modate them in the more limited sphere of magistrate jurisdiction. 75
B. Policy Reasons for a Narrow Interpretation of the FMA
Amidon must be analyzed in light of the status of the youth correc-
tions system at the time of the decision. In the 1970's, the Bureau of
Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1381-82 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Brien,
617 F.2d 299, 310 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980); IA C. Sands, supra
note 38, § 23.10, at 231; see United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 585 (D.C. Cir.
1982). Implicit repeal may also be found when a later act covers the entire subject
matter of an earlier statute and it is clear that the legislature intended it to be a
substitute. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936); United States v.
Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 310 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980).
68. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States
v. Van Lufkins, 676 F.2d 1189, 1194 (8th Cir. 1982).
69. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see Tolson v.
United States, 448 A.2d 248, 252 (D.C. 1982).
70. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010(b), 5017(c) (1976); see Cunningham v. United States, 256
F.2d 467, 472 (5th Cir. 1958) (YCA sentences may be imposed upon misdemeanants).
71. Tolson v. United States, 448 A.2d 248, 251 (D.C. 1982); 1979 House Report,
supra note 15, at 18; 1979 Senate Report, supra note 15, at 7, reprinted in 1979 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1475-76.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a) (Supp. V 1981). Magistrates did exercise jurisdiction over
youth offenders and impose YCA sentences prior to the FMA. See, e.g., Durst v.
United States, 434 U.S. 542, 543-44 (1978); United States v. Bowens, 514 F.2d 440,
440-41 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
73. See supra note 71.
74. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 586-87 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see Tolson
v. United States, 448 A.2d 248, 252 (D.C. 1982).
75. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 586-87 (D.C. Cir. 1982): see Tolson
v. United States, 448 A.2d 248, 252 (D.C. 1982).
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Prisons changed its policy concerning YCA offenders and eliminated
separate YCA programs and facilities. 76 The Bureau's actions were
precipitated by disenchantment with ineffective youth programs and
a general abandonment of the rehabilitative theories on which the
YCA was based. 77 As a result of the Bureau's policy shift, youthful
offenders sentenced under the YCA were incarcerated under condi-
tions identical to adult offenders but were still subject to the longer
YCA sentence. 78 The traditional justification of the longer sentences-
the rehabilitative nature of YCA confinement-no longer applied.7 9
Ainidon interpreted the enactment of the FMA as Congress' recog-
nition of these inequities and rejection of longer YCA sentences.80 The
clearest statement of congressional dissatisfaction with disproportion-
ate sentences, however, would hav& been an amendment or repeal of
YCA sentencing provisions."' There has been no such change in the
history of the YCA.8 2 Moreover, by phrasing the magistrate's sentenc-
ing limit as an exception to the district court judge's authority, 3
Congress implicitly affirmed, rather than rejected, the validity of
longer YCA sentences.8
4
76. Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1359-60 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Leming, 532 F.2d 647, 652-55 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1975) (Weigel, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976); Johnson v. Bell, 487 F. Supp. 977, 986-88 (E.D. Mich.
1980); see Brown v. Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755, 773 (W.D. Wis. 1977); Partridge,
Chaset & Eldridge, The Sentencing Options of Federal District Judges, 84 F.R.D.
175, 201-02 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Partridge].
77. See Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1360 (10th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Bell,
487 F. Supp. 977, 987 (E.D. Mich. 1980). See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
78. See Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1359 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Leming, 532 F.2d 647, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1975) (Weigel, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 978 (1976); United States v. Vaught, 355 F. Supp. 1348, 1349-50 (W.D.
Mo. 1972); Note, The Federal Youth Corrections Act: Flaws in Equal Protection
Analysis, 19 J. Fam. L. 295, 307-08 (1980-1981) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protec-
tion Flaws].
79. United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Leming, 532 F.2d 647, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1975) (Weigel, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976); Note, The Parole Commission and Reorgani-
zation Act: The Impact of Parole Guidelines on the Federal Youth Corrections
Program and Indeterminate Sentencing, 34 Rutgers L. Rev. 491, 515 (1982) [herein-
after cited as Parole Guidelines]; see Hernandez v. United States Attorney Gen., 689
F.2d 915, 919-20 (10th Cir. 1982); Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1365 (10th Cir.
1981); United States v. Lowery, 484 F.2d 457, 458 (3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam);
Equal Protection Flaws, supra note 78, at 306-08. See supra notes 12-13 and accom-
panying text.
80. United States v. Amidon, 627 F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 1980).
81. United States v. Van Lufkins, 676 F.2d 1189, 1194 (8th Cir. 1982); Tolson v.
United States, 448 A.2d 248, 252 (D.C. 1982); see Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354,
1381-82 (10th Cir. 1981).
82. Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1357 (10th Cir. 1981).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g) (Supp. V 1981).
84. See United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Tolson v.
United States, 448 A.2d 248, 252 (D.C. 1982). See supra notes 40-41 and accompany-
ing text.
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Courts have also consistently supported the longer sentences of the
YCA. While recognizing the administrative failure to implement YCA
programs,8 5 courts have repeatedly endorsed a return to, rather than
an abandonment of, the sentencing and treatment scheme of the
YCA.86 The Supreme Court, while never specifically addressing the
constitutionality of sentence disparities, has recognized the validity of
longer sentences of youth offenders when those sentences meet the
requisite treatment provisions. 87 The Bureau of Prisons, recognizing
the need for reform, responded to judicial pressure by implementing a
new plan in compliance with YCA standards.8 8 Treatment centers
have been established at three YCA facilities,8 9 encompassing a wide
range of educational and therapeutic programs. 90
Moreover, Amidon's interpretation fails to recognize that the YCA
and the FMA were enacted for distinctly different purposes. 1 The
85. United States v. Hudson, 667 F.2d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Hopkins, 531 F.2d 576, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Bell, 487 F. Supp. 977, 987
(E.D. Mich. 1980); Watts v. Hadden, 469 F. Supp. 223, 231-32 (D. Colo. 1979),
afJ'd, 651 F.2d 1354 (10th Cir. 1981); Brown v. Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755, 773
(W.D. Wis. 1977); see United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d 107, 113, 114
(3d Cir. 1978).
86. United States v. Hopkins, 531 F.2d 576, 585 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("FYCA
sentencing is the only real alternative to traditional incarceration ... and there is no
justification for negating the avowed intent of the Congress .... ). Some courts
have granted habeas corpus relief to YCA offenders confined under adult conditions.
E.g., United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 1978): Brown
v. Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755, 773 (W.D. Wis. 1977). Others have ordered imple-
mentation of programs in compliance with the YCA. E.g., Johnson v. Bell, 487 F.
Supp. 977, 988 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Watts v. Hadden, 469 F. Supp. 223, 235 (D.
Colo. 1979), aff'd, 651 F.2d 1354 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F.
Supp. 973, 980-81 (D.D.C. 1971); see United States v. Hudson, 667 F.2d 767, 770-71
(8th Cir. 1982) (upholding YCA sentence in anticipation of new Bureau of Prisons
program).
The Second Circuit has struck down as unconstitutional a New York statute that
explicitly provided for longer youth sentences without requiring corresponding reha-
bilitative treatment. United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1120 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975). Courts have been unwilling to extend
the Sero rationale to the YCA because the YCA, on its face, provides for special
treatment for youth offenders and thus satisfies constitutional requirements. United
States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1982): see Equal Protection Flats,
supra note 78, at 308.
87. See Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 219 n.13 (1981): Durst v. United
States, 434 U.S. 542, 545-47 & n.7 (1978): Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424,
431-36 (1974).
88. Bureau of Prisons Program Statement No. 5215.3, at 1 (July 13. 1982): see
United States v. Hudson, 667 F.2d 767, 770-71 (8th Cir. 1982).
89. Bureau of Prisons Program Statement No. 5215.3, at I (July 13, 1982).
90. Id. at 6-9.
91. See United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1982): Tolson v.
United States, 448 A.2d 248, 252 (D.C. 1982). Compare 1950 House Report, supra
note 2, at 1, reprinted in 1950 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. at 3983 (YCA designed to
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YCA was enacted in response to extensive research into the character-
istics of youthful offenders in an attempt to develop an effective
rehabilitation system.9 2 These studies indicated that rehabilitation of
youthful offenders requires a highly specialized system of treatment
that relies heavily on flexibility in the method9 3 and duration of
treatment. 4 The amount of time needed to rehabilitate a particular
youthful offender cannot be predicted.95 The six-year indeterminate
sentence ensures that offenders will be treated for a period sufficient
to accomplish the rehabilitative goals desired, 96 while providing for
early release when the youth is ready to return to society.97
The FMA, in contrast, was not an attempt to provide rehabilitation
for youthful offenders.9 " Rather, its purpose was to increase the effi-
ciency of the court system by expanding the supplemental role of
magistrates.99 Extending the sentencing limits of the FMA to judges
provide treatment that will promote rehabilitation and prevent recidivism) with
1979 House Report, supra note 15, at 1 (FMA designed to expand the jurisdiction of
magistrates and improve access to federal courts).
92. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 432-33 & n.8 (1974); 1950 House
Report, supra note 2, at 2, reprinted in 1950 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. at 3984.
93. Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542, 545-46 (1978); Dorszynski v. United
States, 418 U.S. 424, 434 (1974); Johnson v. Bell, 487 F. Supp. 977, 979-80 (E.D.
Mich. 1980), see Tolson v. United States, 448 A.2d 248, 250-51 (D.C. 1982). In
addition to designating facilities for YCA treatment, the Bureau of Prisons is author-
ized to contract with any public or private agency for the treatment of youthful
offenders. 18 U.S.C. § 5013 (1976).
94. See Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 231-32 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542, 545-46 (1978); United States v. Cruz, 544
F.2d 1162, 1164 (2d Cir. 1976); 1949 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 8 (statement of
James Bennett, Director, Bureau of Prisons); Legislative Reappraisal, supra note 3,
at 244-45.
95. 1949 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 8 (statement of James Bennett, Director,
Bureau of Prisons).
96. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 231 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 1949
Senate Report, supra note 2, at 8 (statement of James Bennett, Director, Bureau of
Prisons). If the adult sentence is longer than six years and the court finds that the
youthful offender may not derive maximum benefit from the six-year indeterminate
sentence, the youth may be sentenced for a longer period not to exceed the adult
sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1976); see United States v. Christians, 702 F.2d 740,
741 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
97. 1949 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 8 (statement of James Bennett, Director,
Bureau of Prisons); see Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1376 (10th Cir. 1981);
Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648, 652 (2d Cir. 1977); Government's Role, supra note
3, at 469. Youths conditionally released from commitment will be under supervision
in the community for at least one year. See supra note 8.
98. See United States v. Donelson, 695 F. 2d 583, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Tolson
v. United States, 448 A.2d 248, 252 (D.C. 1982). See supra note 54 and accompany-
ing text.
99. See Tolson v. United States, 448 A.2d 248, 251 (D.C. 1982); 1979 House
Report, supra note 15, at 1; 1979 Senate Report, supra note 15, at 1, reprinted in
1979 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1469-70.
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would restrict them to a one-year indeterminate sentence for misde-
meanants-which Congress never intended'°°-in place of the six-
year provision that Congress specifically prescribed for judges in the
YCA.
Thus, as recognized by all three branches of government,' 0 ' the
policies that have traditionally justified longer sentences for youthful
offenders are still valid. The FMA, basically an administrative statute,
should not be interpreted as eliminating the sentencing disparities
between adult and youthful offenders which are justified by the Bu-
reau's implementation of rehabilitative programs. Nevertheless, ineq-
uitable sentence disparities remain 10 2 between youths tried before a
judge and those tried before a magistrate because the maximum sen-
tence depends on which official he is sentenced by.1
0 3
100. See Burns v. United States, 552 F.2d 828, 830-31 (8th Cir. 1977): United
States v. Jackson, 550 F.2d 830, 831-32 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Cruz, 544
F.2d 1162, 1164 (2d Cir. 1976). It has been asserted that the flexibility of the YCA
has been undermined by the mechanical application of parole guidelines in determin-
ing when a youthful offender is to be released. United States v. Jackson, 550 F.2d
830, 832 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Cruz, 544 F.2d 1162, 1164 n.6 (2d Cir.
1976); United States v. Torun, 537 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1976); United States ex rel.
Mayet v. Sigler, 403 F. Supp. 1243, 1244 (M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 570
(3d Cir. 1977); Parole Guidelines, supra note 79, at 500-01; see United States v.
Wallulatum, 600 F.2d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir. 1979). The parole guidelines focus on the
severity of the offense rather than the offender's institutional progress. Parole Guide-
lines, supra note 79, at 501; see 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1982). It has been held that the
Parole Commission, in evaluating youthful offenders, must consider both the factors
enumerated in the parole guidelines and the progress of the offender. Watts v.
Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1381 (10th Cir. 1981) ("If release decisions are made
without reference to the progress of the youth offender . . . the indeterminate
sentencing provisions become little more than arbitrary imposition of additional
punishment on youth offenders."). But see Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648, 654 (2d
Cir. 1977) (invalidating retroactive application of parole guidelines to a youthful
offender but recognizing the validity of the guidelines' objective criteria when evalu-
ating youth offenders).
101. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
102. See United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 586, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
When a statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, there is a
presumption against choosing the interpretation that will render the statute unconsti-
tutional. See 2A C. Sands, supra note 38, § 56.04. However, if the words of a statute
clearly indicate that Congress intended a result that is unconstitutional, the law must
be invalidated. United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 998 (1972). The interpretation of the FMA that creates
sentence disparities should be accepted because the legislative history and wording of
the FMA do not support an interpretation that would extend limits to district court
judges. See supra pt. I(A).
103. Similar disparities exist when youths are placed on probation. Under the
FMA, magistrates may only impose on youths a one-year period of probation. 18
U.S.C. § 3401(g)(3) (Supp. V 1981). Youth offenders sentenced by a judge, however,
are subject to the adult probation limit of five years. See id. § 3651 (1976 & Supp. V
1981); Partridge, supra note 76, at 203.
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II. REMAINING DISPARITIES UNDER THE FMA
A. Equal Protection
The only court that has addressed the constitutionality of the sen-
tencing disparities created by the FMA is the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in United States v. Donelson.0 4
The defendant was tried before a district court judge and was con-
victed of the misdemeanor offense of heroin possession. 10 5 Donelson
was within the age requirements of the YCA and was sentenced to the
six-year indeterminate sentence. I0 He challenged his sentence on con-
stitutional grounds, asserting that his right to equal protection had
been violated by the imposition of a maximum term six times longer
than he would have been subject to had he been tried before a
magistrate.107
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law requires
equal treatment for those who are "similarly situated." 08 This guar-
antee of equal treatment, however, will not invalidate every statutory
classification. 0 9 To survive a constitutional challenge, classifications
among similarly situated persons must be at least rationally related to
legitimate governmental goals. 110 In analyzing the constitutionality of
104. 695 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
105. Id. at 584. Donelson was originally charged with both a felony and a misde-
meanor charge. Id. As a result of plea bargaining, the felony charge was dismissed.
Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 588-89; see also Brief for Appellant at 24-25, United States v.
Donelson, 695 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
108. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
76-77 (1971); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); United
States v. Johnson, 634 F.2d 94, 96 (3d Cir. 1980): United States v. Horton, 601 F.2d
319, 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J.
Young, Constitutional Law 519-20 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. Nowak]; Tussman
& tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 341, 344-45 (1949).
109. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 785 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394
U.S. 802, 809 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968); Rinaldi v. Yeager,
384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920); Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 901 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 378 (1982); see, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
54-55 (1973) (Texas system for financing public education based on local property tax
upheld as rationally related to the interest of providing adequate education to all
while maintaining local control over schools); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,
549 (1972) (lower welfare benefits for recipients of Aid to Families With Dependent
Children upheld as a reasonable allocation of state welfare funds); Kincaid v. Duck-
worth, 689 F.2d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 1982) (regulation that assigns different security
status to convicted murderers sentenced to life and convicted murderers sentenced to
a term of years under a revised statute upheld as a reasonable exercise of prison's
authority to preserve security).
110. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 242 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting);
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 183 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
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the FMA sentence limitations, therefore, it must be first determined
whether a youthful offender sentenced by a district court judge is
similarly situated to one sentenced by a magistrate."' If they are
similarly situated, the FMA classification will not be constitutionally
permissible unless it is "reasonable in light of its purpose.""12
1. Similarity of Defendants Sentenced by Magistrates and Judges
The Donelson court held that misdemeanants sentenced by a judge
and those sentenced by a magistrate are not similarly situated. " 3 The
court noted that certain defendants possess unique characteristics re-
quiring that their cases be heard by a judge." 4 Because the expertise of
the magistrate is presumably less than that of the district court judge,
the court concluded that youthful offenders before different officials
dissenting); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973);
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973); Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898,
905 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 378 (1982); J. Nowak, supra note 108, at 524:
see F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) ("[T]he classifica-
tion must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation ...."). When a
classification impedes the exercise of a fundamental right or involves persons belong-
ing to a suspect class it will be subject to a stricter standard of scrutiny. J. Nowak,
supra note 108, at 524. Such a classification will be upheld only if it is necessary to a
compelling state interest. Id. Classifications based upon gender have been scrutinized
under an intermediate standard, which requires that they "must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Id. at 608 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
111. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
112. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964); see F.S. Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
113. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
114. See id. at 589-90. The court interpreted the FMA as granting exclusive
jurisdiction over misdemeanor cases to magistrates unless one of the following cir-
cumstances, which mandate district court adjudication, is present; the defendant's
refusal to consent to magistrate jurisdiction, removal of the case by the district court,
or inclusion of a felony count in the original charge. Id. The wording and legislative
history of the FMA, however, do not support such an interpretation. The statute
grants jurisdiction to magistrates when specifically designated by the district court.
18 U.S.C. 3401(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The magistrate serves as an adjunct to the
district court, exercising his authority as the neds of the court demand. "[A]t all
times the court maintains power to try the case itself." 125 Cong. Rec. 26,819 (1979)
(statement of Rep. Rodino); cf. United States v. Gonzalez-Cervantes, 668 F.2d 1073,
1075-76 (9th Cir. 1981) (while it appears that the magistrate must exercise jurisdic-
tion in a criminal proceeding, his jurisdiction is not mandatory in a juvenile delin-
quency proceeding). The FMA phrases both the magistrate's juvenile and youth
offender jurisdiction in permissive rather than mandatory terms, indicating that in
YCA cases, as well as in juvenile cases, the magistrate is not required to exercise
jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g)(h) (Supp. V 1981).
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cannot be considered similar and therefore are not entitled to equal
treatment. "15
The "unique characteristics" relied on in Donelson, however, do
not justify disparate sentencing. The FMA authorizes magistrates to
hear all misdemeanor cases, 1 6 but provides for two circumstances in
which a district judge will preside: first, if the defendant does not
consent to trial by magistrate; "' and second, if the district judge
removes the case to the district court."" According to Donelson, a
third circumstance-if the misdemeanor charge was initially accom-
panied by a felony charge that was later dismissed or reduced-also
justifies sentencing by the district judge.' While these distinctions
may be valid for determining which forum a defendant should be
tried before,' 2 0 they do not relate to the character of the defendant or
the severity of the offense committed.
For instance, classification based on consent to magistrate jurisdic-
tion is related solely to post-arrest circumstances that relate not to the
defendant's conduct or "situation," but rather to whether he wishes to
exercise his right to trial by a district court judge. A defendant should
not be penalized by a longer maximum sentence because he chooses to
be tried before a judge. 121 Similarly, classification based upon removal
by the district court results in the imposition of longer sentences not
because the crimes committed were more severe, but because the cases
115. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
116. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
117. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (Supp. V 1981); see Rule 2(b)(5)-(6) of Procedure for the
Trial of Misdemeanors Before U.S. Magistrates.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(f) (Supp. V 1981). The court may remove the case on its
own motion or, "for good cause shown," on petition by the prosecution. Id. Good
cause may be based on the novelty, importance, or complexity of the case, the
defendant's criminal history; the desirability of prompt disposition; and the experi-
ence of the magistrate. 28 C.F.R. § 52.02(b)(1) (1982).
119. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 589-90 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Retention
of jurisdiction over these cases is "a necessarily implied exception to the statute's
general rule that misdemeanors be referred initially to magistrates.").
120. See id. For example, if a defendant is initially charged with a felony and
pleads guilty to a misdemeanor, judicial economy would be served by the judge
retaining the case instead of transferring it to a magistrate merely for sentencing.
121. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582-83 (1968) (statute authorizing
death penalty only upon recommendation of jury impermissibly burdens exercise of
defendant's right to jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965)
(comment to jury on defendant's refusal to testify impermissibly penalizes defend-
ant's exercise of fifth amendment right against self-incrimination). But cf. Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-58 (1970) (jury trial right not impermissibly bur-
dened by permitting death penalty only if trial is by jury, if guilty plea was voluntar-
ily and intelligently made). It has been asserted that the youthful misdemeanant's
right to trial by district court judge is impermissibly burdened by the threat of a
longer YCA sentence. Tolson v. United States, 448 A.2d 248, 252-53 (D.C. 1982).
But see United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 590-91 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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were sufficiently "novel," "important" or "complex" to warrant the
district court judge's attention.122 Moreover, these characterizations
may vary depending on the jurisdiction involved and the time con-
straints of a particular judge. For example, a case that is perceived as
routine by an experienced judge with an overloaded docket may be
considered novel by another judge with less experience and more
time. Although the structure of the magistrate system is designed to
allow this very sort of flexibility,12 3 the maximum sentence of a de-
fendant should not be affected by such considerations. Additionally,
subjecting a defendant to a longer sentence because his case is deemed
"novel" or "important" penalizes him on the basis of a determination
that is both subjectively made and unrelated to the severity of his
offense and his rehabilitative needs. 24
The final "unique" circumstance that purportedly justifies the clas-
sification is illustrated in Donelson, in which the defendant was tried
in the district court because a felony charge originally accompanied
the misdemeanor charge.125 The defendant was thus subjected to a
sentence longer than that possible for an identical defendant in the
magistrate's court merely because an unproven (and perhaps baseless)
felony charge had been asserted. The inequity of classifying defend-
ants based upon unproven accusations is magnified when it is noted
that judges, after a felony charge has been dropped, may refer the
remaining misdemeanor charge to a magistrate,2 2 but are not re-
quired to do so. Although judicial economy may justify retaining such
cases in the district court, 27 the length of the defendant's sentence
should not be affected by such an arbitrary standard. 28
122. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. Moreover, reasons for re-
moval need not be given if the case is removed on the district court's own motion. See
18 U.S.C. § 3401(f) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
123. 1979 Hearings, supra note 57, at 137 (testimony of Daniel J. Meador, Assist-
ant Attorney General); 1977 Hearings, supra note 26, at 188-89 (same). See supra
note 55 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
125. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Donelson
was first charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute, a felony under
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976). 695 F.2d at 584. After plea bargaining, he pleaded
guilty to the misdemeanor charge of heroin possession, D.C. Code Ann. §§ 33-502,
-524(a) (1981). 695 F.2d at 584.
126. See United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (interpret-
ing the authorization of "additional duties" in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1976) as
granting district courts the power to refer cases to magistrates).
127. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
128. The Donelson court reasoned that a dismissed felony charge justified the
imposition of a more severe sentence because a sentencing judge may consider facts
related to other charges when determining the sentence to be imposed. 695 F.2d at
590; see United States v. Marines, 535 F.2d 552, 554 (10th Cir. 1976) (per curiam),
United States v. Majors, 490 F.2d 1321, 1324 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
932 (1975); United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
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The Donelson court held that once the defendant is before the
district court, he is not similar to a defendant tried by a magistrate
because the magistrate possesses less expertise than the judge and
therefore should be limited in his sentencing authority. 29 Even as-
suming that the expertise of the trying official has any relevance to
determining whether two defendants are similarly situated, magis-
trates must make the same determinations as district court judges
when sentencing youth offenders. 130 When a youthful defendant is
convicted, each official must impose the YCA sentence unless a spe-
cific finding is made that the defendant will derive no benefit from the
rehabilitative sentence.' 3 1 Each official, in imposing YCA sentences,
must determine whether the defendant is in need of commitment or
should be placed on probation.13 2 If YCA commitment is chosen, the
magistrate must sentence the youth to a YCA sentence not in excess of
one year; 133 the judge must impose the indeterminate six-year sen-
tence. 134 The only discernible difference between defendants tried by
a judge and those tried by a magistrate is the length of sentence that
will ultimately be imposed. The assertion that defendants are not
similarly situated for the purpose of sentencing merely because they
U.S. 843 (1965). However, under the terms of the YCA, more is involved than the
mere exercise of judicial discretion. The judge, once the case is retained and the
defendant is found to be a suitable candidate for YCA commitment, must impose the
indeterminate six-year sentence. See supra note 100. Therefore, the felony accusation
alone determines that the defendant will receive a longer YCA sentence. Compare
Drayton v. New York, 556 F.2d 644, 646-47 (2d Cir.) (upholding statute giving judge
discretion to deny youth offender status based on adverse information), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 958 (1977) and Smith v. Follette, 445 F.2d 955, 959-61 (2d Cir. 1971)
(upholding statute giving sentencing judge discretion to impose narcotics rehabilita-
tive sentence) with People v. Drummond, 40 N.Y.2d 990, 992, 359 N.E.2d 663, 664,
391 N.Y.S.2d 67, 68 (1976) (per curiam) (invalidating on due process grounds statute
that makes availability of youthful offender status "depend solely upon an accusa-
tion"), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977).
129. United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
130. With the exception of the sentence limitation, the magistrate is authorized to
exercise all the powers of the district court. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g) (Supp. V 1981).
131. Id. § 5010(d) (1976); see Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 425-26
(1974).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1976).
133. Id. § 3401(g)(1) (Supp. V 1981). Because the YCA rehabilitative sentence is
authorized for magistrates under the FMA, it would appear that the one-year limit
requires that the sentence be of the same indeterminate character as the YCA six-year
sentence. However, the FMA has been interpreted as authorizing magistrates to
impose a sentence of less than one year. Partridge, supra note 76, at 201. But see
United States v. Sachs, 679 F.2d 1015, 1020 (1st Cir. 1982) (treatment sentence
imposed by a magistrate is the same, in its indeterminate nature, as that imposed by
a judge).
134. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010(b), 5017(c) (1976). See supra note 4. If the adult sentence
is longer than six years, a longer sentence may be imposed if it is determined that the
youth may not derive sufficient benefit from the six-year sentence. Id. § 5010(c).
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are sentenced by different officials is an arbitrary classification based
on illusory distinctions. 135
Based on their offenses alone, misdemeanor defendants, whether
sentenced by a judge or a magistrate, should be considered similarly
situated.' 36 Accordingly, before the classification can be upheld, it
must be determined whether the one-year/six-year sentencing distinc-
tion is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
2. Rational Relationship to a Legitimate Governmental Interest
The classification of youths sentenced by a judge and youths sen-
tenced by a magistrate will be upheld if rationally related to a legiti-
mate governmental interest.' 37 Congress imposed the one-year sen-
tence limitation on magistrates to reconcile the YCA six-year
indeterminate sentence with the traditional limits of magistrate juris-
diction.' 38 While the government may have a legitimate interest in
circumscribing the magistrate's jurisdiction, the sentencing limits of
the FMA do not further this interest.
Magistrates are authorized to try cases involving misdemeanors,' 39
which are defined as crimes carrying a maximum sentence of one year
imprisonment.' 40 Arguably, because youthful misdemeanants are sub-
ject to the six-year sentence, YCA cases, without the one-year restric-
tion, would fall beyond the scope of magistrate jurisdiction.' 4' The
possibility of longer commitment under the YCA, however, does not
convert a misdemeanor into a more serious crime.' 42 The determina-
135. Defendants may not be classified for the purpose of sentencing merely be-
cause a statute subjects them to different sentences. See L. Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law 995 (rejecting outdated standard of equal protection by which "persons or
activities treated differently by government could for that very reason be deemed not
'the same' "); Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 108, at 345 (same). Illusory distinc-
tions may not be used as the basis of classifications. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United
States, 319 U.S. 432, 435 (1943) ("The difference to the probationer between the
imposition of sentence followed by probation ... and suspension of the imposition of
sentence ... is one of trifling degree."); Kincaid v. Duckworth, 689 F.2d 702, 705
(7th Cir. 1982) (Pell, J., dissenting) (Different treatment for inmates sentenced under
earlier law for the same crime "is a semantic distinction without a discernible
difference."); United States v. Johnson, 634 F.2d 94, 96 (3d Cir. 1980) (Because
methods involved in placing a defendant on probation "result in no significant
difference ... probationers in the two situations should be treated similarly.").
136. See United States v. Sachs, 679 F.2d 1015, 1021 (1st Cir. 1982) (rejecting
defendant's asserted interpretation of the FMA's early release clause because it would
treat youths sentenced by a magistrate differently from "similarly situated" youths
sentenced by a district judge).
137. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a) (Supp. V 1981).
140. Id. § 1(1)-(2) (1976).
141. See supra notes 71, 73 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 13.
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tion whether to impose YCA sentencing does not relate to the serious-
ness of the crime committed, but rather to the youthful offender's
potential for rehabilitation. 143 Therefore, the characterization of an
offense as a misdemeanor is unaffected by the possibility of a YCA
sentence.
Moreover, even though the period of YCA commitment may be
longer, it does not result in more severe punishment. 14 4 Longer YCA
commitment has consistently been upheld because it provides treat-
ment "in lieu of ... imprisonment"145 and offers the best chance for
the rehabilitation of youthful offenders. 146 Therefore, the six-year
indeterminate sentence should not be construed as falling outside the
limits of magistrate jurisdiction. Consequently, because the tradi-
tional limits on magistrate jurisdiction were not endangered by the
six-year sentence, the governmental interest in reconciling the two
statutes is not legitimate. As a result, the classification created by the
FMA between youthful offenders tried by magistrates and those tried
by judges cannot withstand equal protection scrutiny.
B. Policy Reasons Against the One-Year Limit
In addition to the equal protection problems of the FMA's sentence
limitations, the policies of the YCA require the elimination of dispari-
ties between sentences imposed by judges and those imposed by magis-
trates. It has been said that "[n]o federal statute having to do with
sentencing compares in comprehensiveness with the [YCA]."' 147 Its
provisions represent a decade of research into the most effective way
of dealing with youthful offenders. 48 The indeterminate sentence was
intentionally designed to exceed the normal time limitations of adult
sentencing to provide the key elements of flexibility and individuality
necessary for proper YCA treatment.149 The one-year sentence of the
143. Harvin v. United States, 445 F.2d 675, 678-79 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971); see Shepard v. Taylor, 556 F.2d 648, 653
(2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Ramirez, 556 F.2d 909, 924 (9th Cir. 1976) (Cham-
bers, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977); Matos v. Rodriguez, 440 F.
Supp. 673, 675-76 (D.P.R. 1976). See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
144. See United States v. Ramirez, 556 F.2d 909, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1976) (Cham-
bers, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977); Harvin v. United States, 445
F.2d 675, 679 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (per curiam), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971);
Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467, 472 (5th Cir. 1958).
145. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) (1976); e.g., Rogers v. United States, 326 F.2d 56, 57
(10th Cir. 1963); Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962);
Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467, 472 (5th Cir. 1958); see United States v.
Vaught, 355 F. Supp. 1348, 1349 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
146. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
147. United States v. Coefield, 476 F.2d 1152, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1973); accord
Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 432 (1974).
148. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
149. Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 231-32 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 543, 546 (1978); United States v. Cruz, 544 F.2d
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FMA was never contemplated by the drafters of the YCA150 and was
devised without consideration of the effects of a shorter sentence on
youthful offenders. 151 To allow youths to choose the one-year sentence
by consenting to magistrate jurisdiction 152 would defeat the flexibility
that Congress has determined is necessary for the success of YCA
treatment.153 Congress, in recognition of YCA goals, extended to the
magistrate the power to impose the rehabilitative sentence;1 54 how-
ever, it reduced the likelihood of successful rehabilitation by so se-
verely limiting the sentence period.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The Judicial Conference, in reviewing the merits of the FMA,
stated that Congress had not recognized the problem of sentence
disparities between judges and magistrates when it enacted the
FMA. 55 The Conference recommended that Congress take steps to
eliminate those disparities. 156 This could be accomplished in several
ways.
For example, Congress could statutorily impose on judges the limits
that Amidon found implicit in the FMA; that is, it could limit all YCA
sentences for misdemeanors to one year.15 7 While this solution would
eliminate constitutional problems by equalizing commitment imposed
in all cases, it would diminish the flexibility of the YCA system, thus
hindering its rehabilitative goals.15
Alternatively, YCA jurisdiction could simply be removed from the
magistrate. Again, this proposal would eliminate sentence disparities
because all YCA defendants would be sentenced by a judge and would
therefore be subject to the six-year sentence. Although this solution
1162, 1164 (2d Cir. 1976); 1949 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 8 (statement of James
Bennett, Director, Bureau of Prisons).
150. See supra note 100.
151. See United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
152. The length of YCA sentences actually encourages the choice of a magistrate.
See United States v. Donelson, 695 F.2d 583, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Tolson v. United
States, 448 A.2d 248, 252 (D.C. 1982); Judicial Conference, supra note 49, at 54.
153. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
154. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(g) (Supp. V 1981); see 1979 Conference Report, supra note
51, at 9-10, reprinted in 1979 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 1490; 1979 House
Report, supra note 15, at 19.
155. Judicial Conference, supra note 49, at 54.
156. Id. at 55. The Conference also recommended the elimination of the one-year
probation limit because it does not provide sufficient time for a meaningful program
of rehabilitation for the youth offender. Id. at 53-54, 84.
157. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. The Judicial Conference ac-
knowledged Amidon's solution but did not specifically endorse it. Judicial Confer-
ence, supra note 49, at 55.
158. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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would further the goals of the YCA,' 59 such a restriction on the
magistrate's authority would frustrate the FMA's goal of judicial effi-
ciency. '6 0 Magistrates have been applauded for their extensive contri-
butions to the judicial system 16 1 and have proven their competence in
the criminal area. 16 2 Their jurisdiction should not be unnecessarily
restricted.
Another solution would be to allow magistrates to try cases involv-
ing youthful misdemeanants but to reserve the function of YCA sen-
tencing to judges. This alternative would enable the magistrate to
hear all cases presently authorized by the FMA while providing de-
fendants with the full benefit of YCA sentencing. Such a division of
authority, however, unnecessarily complicates the trial and sentenc-
ing process, thereby hindering the goals of efficiency and speed. More-
over, as indicated by the authority granted in the FMA16 3 to impose
YCA sentences, the magistrate is competent to make the delicate
determination whether a defendant would benefit from YCA commit-
ment. It is not necessary for the judge to take over this function.
Finally, Congress could eliminate the one-year YCA sentencing
limitation of the FMA, thereby granting magistrates the full sentenc-
ing power of the YCA. This solution is the superior alternative because
it eliminates both the constitutional and policy dilemmas of disparate
sentencing, while furthering the objectives of both the YCA and FMA.
The FMA goal of judicial efficiency is served by keeping youthful
misdemeanants within the magistrate's jurisdiction, and the rehabili-
tative objectives of the YCA are furthered by providing all youthful
misdemeanants with the full benefits of the YCA.
CONCLUSION
The YCA was designed to provide an effective system of rehabilita-
tive treatment for youthful offenders. Limitations imposed by the
FMA undermine the flexibility of the statute and impermissibly im-
pose disparate sentences on similarly situated defendants. While the
disparities may be eliminated in several ways, the only solution that
also furthers the goals of both the YCA and the FMA is amendment of
the FMA to allow the equal exercise of YCA sentencing authority by
judges and magistrates.
Catherine B. Andreycak
159. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
161. Judicial Conference, supra note 49, at 67. See supra note 56 and accompany-
ing text.
162. See supra note 27-29.
163. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
